Assessing the New Abe Administration in Japan by unknown
Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi left a lasting impression as he left office
earlier this year. He shook up the status quo in the political world by shifting the
power from the Liberal Democratic Party headquarters to the prime minister’s
office, decentralized the LDP power base, and forced out any potential threat to 
his throne. These moves were perhaps needed, but also left the new prime minister,
Shinzo Abe, on a path that has never been taken before. 
Everyone agrees that Prime Minister Abe has some large shoes to fill. Does he have
the same charisma that Koizumi displayed to continue with reforms, political, 
economic, or otherwise? Does his choice of cabinet members show what kind of
leader he will be? With both the domestic and international media touting him 
as a nationalist, how will he fare in foreign diplomacy? The answers are still quite
vague and more will be known next year. That said, Gerald L. Curtis, Burgess
Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, shared his insight on Prime
Minister Abe and his administration to a packed audience on September 26.
Professor Curtis was joined by the moderator, Hugh Patrick, Director of the Center
on Japanese Economy and Business and R.D. Calkins Professor of International
Business Emeritus, Columbia Business School. 
This reports the highlights of Professor Curtis’ speech and the following discussion
with audience members. The program was presented in partnership by the
Weatherhead East Asian Institute and the Center on Japanese Economy and
Business, which is celebrating its 20th anniversary. 
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HUGH PATRICK 
Director, Center on Japanese
Economy and Business; 
R.D. Calkins Professor of
International Business Emeritus,
Columbia Business School
It is my honor and pleasure to introduce Professor Gerald
Curtis, Burgess Professor of
Political Science at Columbia
University. As you know, Gerry
is a distinguished scholar of
Japanese politics and in recent
years has spent every spring
semester in Tokyo, meeting
with political and business
leaders, engaging in research,
and incidentally being inter-
viewed by the media and 
on TV a lot. He just returned 
yesterday from a week in
Japan. It seems that every time
a new prime minister is being
elected, Gerry somehow
arranges to go to Japan for a
week and when he comes back
he has a lot to say about what
the new prime minister will be
doing, his policies and so forth.
As you know, Shinzo Abe was
elected as president of the
Liberal Democratic Party on
September 20, and as prime
minister on September 26. 
I think Gerry has personally
known just about every
Japanese prime minister for the
last 30 years. He has met with
Shinzo Abe several times over
the past year and engaged in 
a TV zadankai (roundtable dis-
cussion) with him, as well as
having a number of private
meetings. Prime Minister Abe
was probably much too busy
this last week to meet with
Gerry, but it was probably only
because Gerry was not going 
to be in the Cabinet. I know 
we all look forward to learning
from Gerry about what Prime
Minister Abe’s policies will be,
how they will be carried out,
what will be the difficult chal-
lenges he faces, and to learn
more about his cabinet mem-
bers and senior advisors. 
This is a special event 
co-sponsored by the
Weatherhead East Asian
Institute in a series of events
that the Center on Japanese
Economy and Business is 
holding to celebrate its 20th
anniversary. I want to deny 
the rumor that Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi decided not
to stay on for an extra year, but
to leave at this time in order
that Gerry could give this talk.
Anyway, Gerry, the podium is
yours. 
GERALD L. CURTIS
Burgess Professor of Political
Science, Columbia University
Thank you. I am delightedto see so many people
turn out today, a lot of old
friends from outside Columbia,
a lot of my students, and others.
This is a good opportunity for
us to talk about the significance
of the emergence of Japan’s
new prime minister. He is the
first prime minister to be born
after the Second World War, 
the youngest prime minister 
in the past 65 years, and the
most hawkish prime minister 
in some time. He follows very
much in the tradition of his
grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi,
who was prime minister in the
late 1950s. 
I want to look briefly at the
new Cabinet, the key issues
that Shinzo Abe is going to
face, and the challenges that 
he has to meet if he is going to
be successful as prime minister.
First, a word about this election.
Abe won an overwhelming 
victory with 66 percent of the
vote, that is two thirds of all the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
members of the parliament and
those of the party rank and file
who voted. There were two
other candidates in the race
and no one expected, including
the candidates themselves, that
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anybody else might win. One
of the other candidates, Foreign
Minister Taro Aso, did somewhat
better than had been expected,
especially among the rank and
file. He is ideologically quite
close to Abe and took pretty
much the same policy positions.
Abe has kept him on as foreign
minister, the only person that
has been retained in the cabinet
position that he held under
Koizumi. The other candidate,
Finance Minister Sadakazu
Tanigaki, came in third. Tanigaki
took a different position from
Abe and Aso on key issues. He
favors raising the consumption
tax, ending prime ministerial
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine
and putting greater effort into
Japan’s Asia diplomacy. There
was somewhat more support
for Tanigaki’s policy prescrip-
tions than for Tanigaki himself.
He never really managed to
grab the public’s attention. 
Abe’s popularity needs to
be distinguished from his pre-
decessor’s. Prime Minister
Koizumi came into office riding
a wave of real enthusiasm on
the part of the public. That
enthusiasm, as you know, con-
tinued to grow until he had
nearly a 90 percent approval
rating in the public opinion
polls a few months after being
elected. Abe’s popularity is
more tentative. He is popular
because nobody else is popular.
For five and a half years, Prime
Minister Koizumi basically froze
out the party’s bosses from
positions of power to prevent
them from using a position in
the Cabinet or party leadership
to build a power base. Prime
Minister Koizumi appointed 
no faction head to his Cabinet.
He went further down in the
factional hierarchy or chose
people who had no factional
affiliation. Those who had
power in the party when
Koizumi became prime minister
could do nothing but watch as
their power kind of wilted on
the vine. Five and a half years
later, the only real candidate
was Koizumi’s candidate.
Koizumi’s candidate was Abe.
So he is popular almost, in a
way, by default. 
You do not find many
politicians in the LDP who are
excited about Abe, who say,
“This guy is just terrific, he is
really great.” What they do say
is that he was the best option.
There is a wait-and-see attitude
both within the LDP and the
public as a whole. Nearly
everyone, in the end, jumped
on the Abe bandwagon. And 
if he falters, they will jump on
Abe. So, he has to move fairly
quickly to establish his credibil-
ity as a leader. He is the first
LDP politician who has become
prime minister without having
held a cabinet position except
for the one he held under
Koizumi as the chief cabinet
secretary. The chief cabinet 
secretary is a crucially impor-
tant position, but it does not
involve executive power. It
does not involve running a line
ministry. The chief cabinet sec-
retary is the government’s chief
spokesman and the prime min-
ister’s right-hand man, a kind of
equivalent to the White House
chief of staff. So Abe is
untested. That does not mean
he might not turn out to be a
terrific prime minister, but at
this point the only thing you
can say about Abe with confi-
dence is that he is a question
mark. There is uncertainty
about what he is going to do
on domestic policy, on China
relations and on foreign policy
more generally, and on how 
he is going to organize his
administration. 
Prime Minister Abe has to
do three things in particular 
to be successful. The first thing
he has to do is to get people
not to compare him to Prime
Minister Koizumi. Abe has to
try to avoid having the media
remind the public that he does
not measure up to Koizumi and
that he does not have the flare.
No one measures up to Koizumi
in terms of style. Abe cannot
croon “Love Me Tender” and
try to be cool like Koizumi. 
He cannot compete on style.
He has to compete on substance.
He has to get the public and
the media to focus their atten-
tion on the kind of policies he
is trying to push. The problem
is that he has no clear policy
agenda. This was partly the
consequence of there being no
real contest in the party presi-
dential election. Abe’s victory
was a foregone conclusion 
and he was careful not to say
anything that might give his
opponents an unexpected
opening. So he never focused
in the campaign on policies.
And we do not know what
concrete policies Abe is going
Nearly everyone, 
in the end, jumped
on the Abe 
bandwagon. 
And if he falters,
they will jump 
on Abe.
—Gerald Curtis
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to push. He has no legislation
of his own to put forward to
this Diet session. All the bills
coming up are carryovers from
Prime Minister Koizumi. So he
has to scramble, I think pretty
quickly, to come up with some
specific policies. 
Right now, what we know
about Abe is pretty much
dependent on general state-
ments he has made that reflect
a nationalist and socially con-
servative point of view. He 
says he wants to revise the
Constitution, not just amend
parts of it. He wants to revise
the whole Constitution so that
Japan finally has a constitution
written by the Japanese rather
than by the Americans who
occupied Japan after the Second
World War. But what specifically
does he want to change, and
how does he want to change it?
He has not said. Even if he lasts
in office a relatively long time,
it is highly unlikely that the
Japanese Constitution will be
revised while Abe is Prime
Minister of Japan. Building a
consensus on revision is going
to take several years. If Abe
stays in office for as long as
Koizumi did, he may be able to
move the constitutional revision
process forward but not get it
changed on his watch. What he
will probably be able to do is
get a bill that sets the procedures
for the public referendum on
constitutional revision to pass
the Diet, possibly in this fall’s
session. To revise the Constitution,
there needs to be an affirmative
vote of two thirds of all mem-
bers in both Houses of the Diet,
followed by majority support in
a public referendum. But there
are no procedures in place as
to how that referendum is to be
carried out. 
I had the opportunity to talk
with Abe about a month before
he became prime minister. 
In responding to my question
about what he hoped to
accomplish as prime minister,
he talked quite a bit about
social issues, especially educa-
tion. He is concerned about 
the deterioration of the quality
of public school compulsory
education and favors major
education reform. But for the
time being his major emphasis
is on getting through a revision
of what is called the Fundamental
Law on Education to emphasize
the importance of patriotism and
love of country. That responds
to an ideological concern, but it
does not deal with the concrete
problems of both pre-college
and university level education. 
Prime Minister Abe also has
made the slogan sai-challenge,
or “second chance” a major
theme. Japan is a rather unfor-
giving society toward people
who do not get onto a conven-
tional career track early in life.
Providing greater second
chance opportunities is a very
important issue for Japanese
society. Because of the long
recession, there are many
freeters, people who do part-
time work or are hired as
contract workers rather than as
regular workers. Now they are
in their mid or late twenties
and unable to find attractive
employment opportunities. 
But there is remarkably little
policy content to the second
chance slogan. And by empha-
sizing this issue, Abe himself 
is reinforcing what seems to 
me to be an exaggerated view
in Japan of how serious the
inequality issue is. For those 
of us who work at Columbia
University and look out from
our office windows at Harlem,
the realities of inequality stare
up at us every day and are far
more serious than anything the
Japanese know or probably
even imagine. Abe’s emphasis
on second chance leads
inevitably to a conclusion that
if the government is going to
do something about it, it will 
in one way or another have to
take money from people who
have it and transfer it to people
who do not. Or it will take
measures to force companies 
to treat their workers in accord
with government directives
rather than market forces.
There is considerable support
in the LDP, for example, to force
companies to give permanent
employee status to contract
workers who have been on the
job for three or six months. So
Abe is in a position where he is
saying that he wants to cut gov-
ernment spending and continue
reform, but where his rhetoric
gives support to those who
want to slow down the reform
process and reassert greater
government control over the
economy. This is exacerbated
by the view that the inequality
problem is the consequence 
of Koizumi’s market oriented
reforms, when in reality it is 
Right now, 
what we know
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the consequence of fifteen
years of recession. 
During the election cam-
paign, Abe studiously avoided
taking a position on the issue
that Tanigaki, the finance 
minister, pushed the hardest,
namely, whether or not to raise
the consumption tax. I am cer-
tain that Abe believes that the
consumption tax needs to be
raised but that it would be
political suicide to raise the
issue before next summer’s
Upper House election and 
dangerous to raise the tax
before the economic recovery
is on firmer ground. I think 
Abe is concerned that the
media will beat up on him if 
he indicates support for a 
consumption tax increase; he 
is going to put it off until after
the Upper House election next
summer. But his instincts are to
move in that direction. 
Another issue that he has
put forward, already creating
some controversy within his
own Cabinet, is to change the
official interpretation of Article
9 so Japan has the right to par-
ticipate in so-called collective
defense. Collective defense
means that Japan could form an
alliance or make a commitment
to help another country in its
defense. This goes beyond the
current interpretation of Article
9, which states that Japanese
defense is limited to the
defense of its own homeland.
The U.S.-Japan security treaty,
in theory, only obligates the
United States to defend Japan;
there is no reciprocal obligation
in theory. In practice, Prime
Minister Koizumi responded to
the terrorist attack on September
11 by getting the Diet to
authorize Japanese logistical
support to provide supplies
destined for American troops
fighting in Afghanistan, sent
troops to Iraq and took other
steps to prove to the United
States that Japan is a trustworthy
ally in the post–September 11
world. But significant constraints
still exist with regard to the
Japanese use of military power.
Abe wants to change Article 9
of the Constitution to remove
those constraints and, even
before constitutional revision,
change the official interpretation
of Article 9 to allow collective
defense. But there is consider-
able resistance to doing that
from within the LDP itself, from
its coalition partner the Komeito,
and from the public at large.
Moreover, even if the interpre-
tation were to be changed, it is
not at all clear what the specific
policy consequences of that
change would be. What it would
do is scare Japan’s neighbors
without necessarily changing
Japanese defense policy very
much. 
So, to conclude what I have
said up to now, Prime Minister
Abe has to shift the focus from
style to substance and clarify
what his domestic agenda is.
He has to move relatively
quickly if he is going to avoid
creating an image of drift and
indecisiveness. As I said in the
beginning, there is a wait-and-
see attitude about Abe. But
people won’t wait too long
before they think they know
what they see. If he seems
uncertain about his program,
many people will come to the
conclusion that it was prema-
ture for Abe to become prime
minister. Once that view becomes
widespread, it is going to be
very difficult for Abe to turn it
around. And the danger is that
he will try to turn it around by
playing a sort of nationalist card.
Abe’s Cabinet appointments
in one sense may suggest that
he is fully aware of the need
not to emulate Koizumi’s style.
This is not an exciting cabinet.
There is no big surprise.
Everybody was talking about
who is going to be the surprise
Cabinet appointment, whom 
he is he going to bring in that
people would sit up and say,
“Wow, that is cool.” The media
would have criticized him as a
populist if he appointed people
because of a calculation that
they would be attractive to the
public, and they criticized him
anyway for appointing a dull
cabinet. He took a kind of
orthodox approach. There is
only one person who is not a
Diet member in the Cabinet,
the new head of the Economic
and Fiscal Policy Council,
Hiroko Ota. There is no razzle-
dazzle in this Cabinet. In one
sense, it is reassuring that he
understands he cannot play
Koizumi’s game of trying to 
use the Cabinet as a way to
inject a lot of popular support
for his administration just on
the nature of his appointments.
That is the good news. On the
other hand, the key domestic
and economic portfolios are
Abe wants to
change Article 9 
of the Constitution.
—Gerald Curtis
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held by people who do not
have particularly strong creden-
tials for the jobs they now
have. The Finance Minister,
Kouji Omi, is a key leader in
Abe’s own faction. He was the
head of the Economic Planning
Agency in the mid 1990s and
he is a former Trade Ministry
bureaucrat who I think most
people assume will pretty
much represent the views of
the Finance Ministry in the
Cabinet. One of his most
important appointments was
the Chief Cabinet Secretary,
Yasuhisa Shiozaki. Shiozaki is
well known among Americans,
but in Japanese politics he has
not been one of the key people
in the party. Abe has now
given him the opportunity to
become one of the party’s most
important players. My sense is
that Abe wanted him as chief
cabinet secretary because, first
and foremost, Abe completely
trusts him. One thing we learn
about Abe from this Cabinet 
is that almost everyone he
appointed is either his personal
friend or someone he felt he
owed a debt because they
came out early to support him
in the race. Shiozaki supported
Abe from early on. He is a 
former Bank of Japan official,
his father was a well-known
finance minister, and so he is
familiar with economic issues.
Abe is not. Abe wants to center
policy making in the prime
minister’s office, something 
that Prime Minister Hashimoto
started and that Koizumi
emphasized. So he needs
someone at his right hand who
understands and advises him
on economic issues and manages
the Kantei, the prime minister’s
office, for him. And that is going
to be Shiozaki. 
The other two key economic
portfolios are the minister in
charge of the Financial Services
Agency (FSA) and the economic
minister who manages the
Council on Economic and
Fiscal Policy. Heizo Takenaka
held these positions simultane-
ously when Koizumi was prime
minister and he was in effect
Koizumi’s economic czar. That
is not the situation any longer.
Ota is the economic minister.
We were colleagues at the
Graduate Research Institute for
Policy Studies. She is well liked
and is committed to continuing
Takenaka’s policies but she
does not have a political base
and she does not have the
backing of a prime minister
determined to give economic
reform priority as Koizumi did.
The head of the FSA is Yuji
Yamamoto, who does not have
much prior experience dealing
with financial issues. I can
answer your questions about
other individuals in the Cabinet
in the discussion period, but
the point is that there is not a
clear and strong message that
comes through about what 
Abe wants to do on domestic,
economic, and social issues. He
has a lot of social conservatives
in the government and a hawkish
foreign policy team. It includes
Aso, the foreign minister, who
stays on, and Shoichi Nakagawa,
who is the head of the Policy
Affairs Research Council in the
LDP. Well known as a hard-liner,
Nakagawa was Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI) minister under Koizumi.
Abe wants to create a National
Security Council modeled on
the United States and has
appointed Yuriko Koike as his
national security advisor. But
little planning has been done to
actually set up such a council
and it is questionable when it
will materialize.
There is general agreement
in Tokyo that Abe is more
interested in focusing on for-
eign policy and on issues of
patriotism, nationalism, and
Japan standing tall in the world,
than he is on domestic social 
or economic issues. It is some-
what ironic that the first prime
minister to be born in the 
post-war period raises such
fundamental questions about
the desirability of continuing
policies and strategies Japan
has adopted during the post-
war period. Abe talks a lot
about restoring Japanese pride.
He has written a book called
Utsukushii Kuni e, or “Toward
a Beautiful Country.” The impli-
cation of the title and the theme
of the book is that Japan is not
so beautiful now but it will be
if it takes greater pride in the
nation, changes policies adopted
under the American occupation,
and takes a more muscular
approach to foreign policy. 
He likes to use this simile of a
Japan in the post-war period
that has been operating in a
sumo ring in which others set
the rules, but now wants to 
be one of the rule setters. The
One thing we learn
about Abe from




or someone he felt
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out early to support
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world has changed a great deal
since Prime Minister Yoshida
set the framework for Japan’s
foreign policy back in 1950. It
is natural and unavoidable that
Japan reinvent its foreign policy
strategy. But what is character-
istic of Prime Minister Abe is
that there is a lot of abstract
talk that evokes an emotional
response on the part of the
Japanese public without much
specificity as to what exactly 
he would like to see Japan do.
Nonetheless, I think we will
see somewhat dramatic devel-
opments in Japanese foreign
policy over the next few months
that will surprise a lot of people.
The newspapers are going to
be writing about how unex-
pected it is that Prime Minister
Abe is taking such strong initia-
tives to improve relations with
China. [This speech was given
before the announcement of
Abe’s visit to Beijing.] I expect
that we are going to see a 
honeymoon in relations
between Japan and China. 
Abe will meet with Hu Jintao 
in Vietnam in November at 
the Asian Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit
meeting. He may go to Beijing
before then. He will make an
effort to improve relations with
China. And everything that we
have seen shows that the Chinese
are busy sending signals to
Tokyo that they want to
improve relations with Japan
and that they see Koizumi’s
departure as the opportunity 
to resume a dialogue with the
new prime minister. So there 
is a mutual interest in trying to
move this relationship forward,
and it will work until sometime
next year when Abe is going to
have to decide what he is going
to do about visiting the Yasukuni
Shrine. He has not said that 
he will visit Yasukuni. Prime
Minister Koizumi too, after
making a commitment in the
2001 party presidential election
campaign to visit Yasukuni on
August 15, never again said
whether he would or would
not visit the shrine. He said he
would deal with the issue in an
“appropriate manner.” In fact,
he visited the shrine every year
he was prime minister, and 
in his final finger-in-your-eye
gesture to China, he went on
August 15 this year, the day
that commemorates the end of
the war. 
Prime Minister Abe is using
similar language to make his
own intentions ambiguous. The
Chinese probably hope that
ambiguity means he will not 
go while he is prime minister.
People on the Japanese right
want to believe that the Chinese
acceptance of ambiguity means
that they are willing to accept
Abe’s visiting the shrine. 
I cannot see how Abe can visit
Yasukuni and avoid a sharp
deterioration in relations with
China and an adverse reaction
elsewhere in Asia and in the
United States, as well. But I do
think for the next few months
we will see him take initiatives
to try to improve relations with
China. Earlier this year I had 
a discussion with Abe on
Japanese television about
Yasukuni and other issues.
Abe’s point was that if Japan
gives in to Chinese pressure 
on the Yasukuni issue that will
only send a message to China
that China’s pressure tactics
work. Then it will be used on
East China Sea energy develop-
ment issues, on Senkaku Island
issues, and so on. So Japan has
to draw a line in the sand and
convince the Chinese that for-
eign pressure, gaiatsu, will not
work. The reason why there
was a lot of domestic support
for Koizumi’s position on the
Yasukuni visit was precisely
because Koizumi was able 
to frame the issue as one of
whether Japan should kowtow
to China. Support for the prime
minister’s visits to Yasukuni
increased in proportion to
Chinese protests of those visits.
The truth is, however, that
Yasukuni is not a good issue
for Japan to draw a line in the
sand. Japan can only lose in the
court of world opinion over the
issue of war responsibility.
There are many competing pro-
posals for how to deal with the
Yasukuni issue. The best and
unfortunately the least likely
one is to thoroughly depoliticize
Yasukuni. The people who are
paying the highest price for this
issue are the family members of
those who died in the war and
are being manipulated for polit-
ical purposes. They are either
being used by the Japanese
right wing to glorify Japanese
wartime behavior or indirectly
by the Chinese who see the
history issue as a useful card 
to be played against Japan. 
The problem is not simply the
I expect that we are





Yushukan, the war museum
that is at Yasukuni. I have been
to Yasukuni several times, but
when I visited three years ago,
I went to the inner shrine to
pay my respects. While you
wait to be taken in by the priest
to this inner sanctum, you are
seated in front of a television
monitor that shows a film about
the Tokyo war crimes trial. This
is not in the museum; this is in
the inner shrine itself. Yasukuni
should be a quiet place where
people can go with their mem-
ories of those they lost in the
war. Instead, it is a politically
inspired institution caught up 
in intense controversy. And as
long as it is, it is going to be 
a political hot potato for the
prime minister. 
Looking at the media cover-
age of Abe, especially the global
media, I am reminded of how
the media treated Yasuhiro
Nakasone when he was the
prime minister in the early
1980s. When he became prime
minister, he was widely seen 
as a Japanese Gaullist. He was
going to lead Japan to have
nuclear weapons, to revise the
Constitution, to weaken the
alliance with the United States
and become an autonomous
power. He not only went to
Yasukuni, but for the first time
he got the Cabinet to approve it
as an official visit. I remember
being in a small group of schol-
ars who had dinner with Prime
Minister Nakasone soon after
he was elected. He sat across 
a table from us and said, “Your
president goes to Arlington
Cemetery, how can you tell me
not to go to Yasukuni?” But he
saw the damage that it did to
Japanese national interest and
he never went back. He was a
nationalist who wanted Japan
to stand tall, but when he
became prime minister he
accepted that the national 
interest must trump personal
ideology. Pragmatism won out,
and the question about Abe 
is whether he is pragmatic or
whether ideology will drive 
his policies. 
There is some reason to
believe that pragmatism may
win out. Abe has become
prime minister at a time when
three eras have simultaneously
ended in Japan. He has to fig-
ure out how to lead Japan into
a new era. First of all, it is the
end of a political era. The five
and a half year Koizumi admin-
istration was the most unique
political regime in post-war
Japan. He cannot continue poli-
tics the way Koizumi played it
and I think he understands that.
It is also the end of an economic
era, of 15 years of deflation and
economic trouble for Japan.
Now he has to deal with the
political issues of managing
Japan’s economic recovery 
and resisting or dealing with
the pressures from the LDP 
to spend more money, the
Ministry of Finance to raise
taxes, and so on. Thirdly, it is
the end of 50 years of timidity
on the international political
stage. The low posture adopted
from the days of Prime Minister
Yoshida is giving way to some-
thing else. And that would be
the case no matter who the
prime minister might be. Japan
cannot rely on the United States
necessarily seeing it to be in its
national interest to view issues
in ways that are seen to be in
Japan’s national interest. That
was much easier during the
Cold War than it is now. Japan
has to deal with a rising China
and a nuclear North Korea. 
And it has to respond to U.S.
demands that allies cooperate
in the struggle against Islamic
terrorism. 
Prime Minister Abe knows
that Japan has to change but
the question is whether he has
a strategy. If you do not have 
a strategy and just have an atti-
tude, you can get yourself into
a lot of trouble. And if a key
part of the strategy is to rally
Japanese nationalism against
supposed efforts by other
countries to tell Japan what to
do, then there is going to be
deterioration in Japan’s rela-
tions with its neighbors. And
the problem for Japan is that if
there is continuing deteriora-
tion of Japan’s relations with 
its neighbors and Americans
conclude that the key reason 
is because of Abe’s revisionist
attitude about history, it will not
play well in the United States.
So there is reason for con-
cern. There are a lot of very
conservative people in key
positions in this administration
who create pressures to play
the nationalist card. Nonetheless,
there are powerful domestic
pressures that operate to 
constrain government policy.
Moreover, the United States
wants to have an alliance with
Prime Minister Abe
knows that Japan
has to change but
the question is
whether he has 
a strategy.
—Gerald Curtis
8 Assessing the New Abe Administration in Japan
Japan and a good relationship
with China at the same time.
There are lots of pressures on
Abe to be pragmatic and mod-
erate. Koizumi was the second
longest-serving prime minister
since the LDP came into power
after Prime Minister Eisaku
Sato, and the third longest since
the end of the Second World
War, following Shigeru Yoshida
and then Sato. Prime Minister
Abe has a really tough election
coming up not that far away.
Next summer there is going to
be an election for the Upper
House. Those members whose
terms are ending are those
elected six years ago, three
months after Koizumi became
prime minister, when his popu-
larity was close to 90 percent.
So the LDP did a lot better 
in 2001 than it should have
expected to, and it is not going
to do as well next year. The
question is, how badly the LDP
will fare, and if it does very
badly, there will be pressures
to force Abe out. So some peo-
ple think he will not last very
long, and others believe he 
will survive. There is no way 
to know at this point.
Finally, there are two other
parties that are relevant players
in this game. One is the Komeito.
The day before yesterday in
Tokyo I spent about two and a
half hours with Akihiro Ota, the
new head of the Komeito and
someone I have known for
more than a decade. We had 
a dialogue that is going to be
published in the party newspa-
per on the day of his election
to party president at the end of
this month. Ota talks about the
Komeito’s participation in the
LDP coalition government from
1998 until now as the first
phase of coalition partnership.
The second phase, under his
leadership, is to begin now.
The Komeito under Ota is
likely to be less amenable to
the conservative policy goals of
Abe than it was under its previ-
ous leadership. And there is a
debate below the surface in the
Komeito about the future of
that party, whether it should
continue its alliance with the
LDP or try to take a position
similar to the Free Democrats
in Germany, swinging from
support of one party to another
at different times and on differ-
ent issues. So if you are a Japan
politics watcher, one thing to
watch is how the Komeito moves
under this new leadership. 
The other party is the oppo-
sition party, the Democratic
Party of Japan (DJP). What you
can say is that the LDP is not as
strong as it looks, and the DPJ
is not as weak as it appears.
Last year, the LDP swept the
September election, but it was
not the LDP that won the elec-
tion. It was Koizumi that won
the election. And what we
know about Koizumi is not
only did he win the election,
but also over the past five and
a half years he has done a lot
to destroy the LDP’s vote-gath-
ering machine. So we do not
know how strong the LDP is
without Koizumi or without a
very popular leader. The DPJ
did badly in terms of seats 
last September, but it actually
increased the absolute number
of votes it got. It is just that the
voting rate went up because of
the excitement Koizumi gener-
ated. The so-called “Koizumi
children” won and the DPJ lost.
But the party is actually stronger
than it appears. Its leader, Ichiro
Ozawa, so far has handled him-
self very well as president of
the DPJ. If he continues to do
so and if his health holds up,
he could be a formidable oppo-
nent to Abe and the LDP. But
unfortunately, one thing we
know about the opposition in
Japan is that it always has found
a way to surprise observers by
finding ways to self-destruct.
And so you should not dismiss
the possibility that it will do
that again, and Abe, in a way,
will get a free ride. 
So this is a rather inconclusive
talk about the Abe administra-
tion for what I think is a very
good reason. It is not possible
to give a talk about the Abe
administration that concludes
very much because he is an
unknown, and drawing conclu-
sions is premature. We know
he cannot do it the Koizumi
way. He has to do it through
teamwork. If he thinks he can
make decisions in the prime
minister’s office and force it
down the throat of the LDP, 
he will be history before very
long. He has to work with his
party. He has to build a con-
sensus. In a way, he has to be 
a more old-fashioned political
leader while convincing the
public that he is not old-fash-
ioned. This is all pretty tough.
Is he up to the task? No one
What you can say
is that the LDP is
not as strong as it
looks, and the DPJ
is not as weak 
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knows. I apologize for not
being able to give you a stronger
message, but this I believe is 
an accurate summary of the
current Japanese political
scene. Thank you. 
DISCUSSION
QUESTION
Could you tell us moreabout the economic team?
Is it going to carry out eco-
nomic reforms? Do you have
much of a sense of who the
players are? In addition to the
cabinet members, are there
other economic advisors? 
GERALD CURTIS
I mentioned the key eco-nomic cabinet ministers:
Omi in Finance, Yamamoto in
the FSA, and Shiozaki as the
chief cabinet secretary. The
Agriculture Minister, Toshikatsu
Matsuoka, is regarded as one
of the most pro-agriculture
lobby members of the LDP. 
So either this is going to be a
“Richard Nixon goes to Beijing”
kind of phenomenon where
because he is so popular with
the protectionist agriculture
lobby in Japan, he is the one
who can bring them along to
accept greater agricultural lib-
eralization, or Japan’s desire 
to forge free trade agreements
with Asian countries will be
thwarted by its refusal to open
its markets to agricultural prod-
ucts. I think the chances are
good that he will be a strong
voice for agriculture protection
in this government. That is not
good news for people who
want to see economic reform.
Shiozaki is not yet a real heavy-
weight in the LDP and as chief
cabinet secretary he is really
not on top of managing those
issues. Nakagawa, the chairman
of the LDP’s policy council, is
in a very critical position, but
his interests are almost entirely
on the foreign policy side. And
Yamamoto at the FSA does not
have a track record. Ota, who
is a good friend of mine and a
terrific person, has no political
clout. She is not Takenaka,
who was in a very special
position. First of all, he had the
whole portfolio. He had the
FSA and the Council, and he
had Koizumi, the most popular
prime minister in recent history,
100 percent behind him. That
is not true for Ota. I think a lot
of economic analysts look at
this Cabinet and are somewhat
concerned that it is not made
up of very strong people and
does not have a strong message.
However, the most important
thing is that they do not do
something wrong. In other
words, if they do not do much
of anything that is not so bad,
because so much is being driven
by the private sector. It is not
government spending that has
been driving the economic
recovery, just the opposite; it is
the government getting out of
the way of the private sector.
So as long as the government
does not do something precipi-
tous to set back reform or pull
the rug out from under the
recovery, that may be good
enough. The looming issue is
the increase in the consump-
tion tax. It will be raised, I am
certain, but they are not going
to talk about it until the Upper
House election. Then they 
will talk about it and then the
following year pass it to be
implemented in the year fol-
lowing that. So I expect the
consumption tax to be increased,
probably to eight percent or so
from the current five percent,
in 2009 or 2010.
QUESTION
How do you think Abe’snationalism will affect
foreign policy? Is he really that
similar to Nakasone?
GERALD CURTIS
Well, what we knowabout Nakasone is that
he is a sophisticated strategic
thinker about foreign affairs.
Nakasone is opposed to the
Yasukuni Shrine visit by the
prime minister because of his
more general concern about
relations with Asian countries
and China, in particular. We
really do not know what kind
of leader Abe will turn out to
be, but he has given no indica-
tion that he is a sophisticated,
strategic thinker about inter-
national affairs. I do not mean
that necessarily that he will not
prove to be one, but there is no
evidence of it. He talks much
more in emotional terms about
patriotism, nationalism, and a
more muscular foreign policy
without conveying a sense that
he has thought strategically
about Japan’s role in the world.
He does emphasize what he
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calls a strategy of strengthening
Japan’s ties with other democ-
racies in Asia, especially India
and Australia. That is fine, but
the idea that a Japan-India link-
age can somehow serve as a
balancer against China is fanci-
ful. India and China have been
working very hard to improve
their relations and India is not
about to get into some sort of
anti-Chinese coalition with
Japan. So as I said, what con-
cerns me about this group of
people in the leadership right
now is that though they are
younger and raised in the post-
war period, there is this kind of
nationalism that does not have
clear policy content. The worst
thing is to simply use rhetoric
without content, because what
that does is either scare people
or make them jump to conclu-
sions that are not justified. After
all, it is kind of odd that China,
with a military budget that
increases 15, 16, 17 percent a
year and has for the last 15
years or so, is able to say it is
engaged in a peaceful rise,
while Japan, which has cut its
defense budget by about a per-
centage point a year for the last
five years and is going to come
in at zero or maybe at a slight
increase this year, and is the
one country in the world that
has actually had a peaceful rise
over the past 60 years, is some-
how viewed as on the verge 
of a new kind of militarism.
But, a lot of the reason for this
perception is the rhetoric that
comes out of Tokyo itself, out
of the key leaders in the LDP,
including those who now run
the government. 
QUESTION
What is South Korea and China’s reaction to
Abe’s proposal to revise the
Constitution, especially Article
9? How would this affect 
or impact the relationship
between the three countries? 
GERALD CURTIS
The Bush administrationhas formally said, “Look, 
it is your decision. We do not
have an opinion, but it really
would be terrific if you revise
Article 9.” Both former
Secretary of State Colin Powell
and former Deputy Secretary 
of State Richard Armitage have
publicly, on Japanese TV,
encouraged Japan to revise
Article 9. “Get Japanese boots
on the ground in Iraq and else-
where,” is the language that
Richard Armitage has used. 
I think that if a Democratic
administration comes into
power in 2009, it will be 
the same. I think, generally,
American political leaders in
Washington think if there is a
job to be done in terms of
security, why should we not
demand that Japan too con-
tribute militarily? If you think
just in bilateral terms, then
there is a natural inclination to
say that the Japanese should
revise Article 9, they should
become a normal country, they
should put their boots on the
ground along with American
boots and their soldiers should
die like American soldiers, in
Iraq or anywhere else where
that might be necessary. If you
think in regional and in
broader terms about American
interest in the region as a
whole, it seems to me it is not a
good idea to encourage Japan
to drastically augment its mili-
tary roles and missions. In East
Asia, opinion is the opposite of
what you find in Washington.
In China and in South Korea,
especially, the concern is about
a revival of Japanese military
power that would threaten the
region. The reaction is exces-
In China and 
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sive and unrealistic in my view.
If Article 9 is going to be revised
in several years, the revision
that most of the LDP members
would support, leave aside the
rest of the country, and the
only revision that would get
anything close to the two thirds
vote of Diet members that you
would need is one that essen-
tially codified the status quo.
Most of the people who are
advocating revising Article 9 are
pretty moderate, saying, “We
have a military. Why kid our-
selves and the world? We call it
the self-defense force and the
Constitution says we do not
have a military, but we do so
let us say so.” Advocates would
like to see the Constitution
specify that the Japanese 
military can participate in UN
sanctioned peace keeping
operations but otherwise there
is broad support for keeping
constitutional constraints on the
military. But the Chinese, the
South Koreans, and the North
Koreans will portray constitu-
tional revision as some sort of
revival of Japanese militarism.
This all feeds on itself. It cre-
ates a dynamic of its own. 
If the Japanese feel they are
being unfairly accused of doing
something they are not doing,
by countries that are trying 
to keep Japan down, there is
going to be a natural (as we
see already) nationalist reaction
in Japan. 
By the way, Abe has a very
different view of Korea than 
he does of China. His view on
South Korea is that Japan has
problems with South Korea, 
but since the country is a
democracy, things will work
out. They are manageable. The
problem is Japan is butting up
against China. Now for the first
time, both of these countries
are great powers and they are
trying to figure out how they
can live with each other. It is
very important for the Chinese
to have a sophisticated strategy
to deal with Japan, because if
the strategy is simply to use
gaiatsu, foreign pressure, and
lecture the Japanese about
what they should do, you
know what you will get. 
We have already seen the 
reaction of Koizumi to 
Chinese pressure. 
QUESTION
One of the most importantaspects of the Koizumi
administration would be that
Koizumi showed a new type of
leadership in Japan by having
a lot more policy initiative
compared to the prime minis-
ters in the past. This could
have been because of his per-
sonal character or other factors,
but at the same time, it could
have been because of political,
administrative, and institutional
reforms. What is your opinion
about the continuities and 
discontinuities of the Japanese
Prime Ministership?  
GERALD CURTIS
That is a good question.The institutional changes
you refer to were not brought
about by Koizumi. They were
instituted by Prime Minister
Hashimoto with the primary
purpose of strengthening the
role of the prime minister’s
office in policy making. He set
up the structure, but it first
came into effect in February
2001. Koizumi became prime
minister in April 2001, so
Koizumi is the first prime 
minister who actually breathed
life into this new structure. And
the new structure changed the
dynamic of policy making and
shifted the center of gravity
away from the LDP and into
the prime minister’s office. 
That new institutional context
for policy making is going 
to continue, but how it gets
implemented is hugely depend-
ent on personality. Koizumi 
not only centered the policy
making in the prime minister’s
office, but he basically told his
party that as long as he was
prime minister they would do
what he wanted, and if they
did not like it they could try 
to replace him. He purged 
people who opposed his 
policy on postal system reform.
If Koizumi had not driven key
party leaders out of the party 
in advance of the September
election, because they opposed
postal reform, Abe would 
have had a much tougher time
becoming prime minister. 
There would have been Takeo
Hiranuma, a very conservative,
very powerful man, who would
have been in the race. He was
purged. There also was a
chance that the prime minister
today would be a woman,
Seiko Noda, if she had not
been purged.  












prime minister, he appointed
Takenaka, an academic and
economic commentator, as a
kind of economic czar and
gave him complete backing.
And so the Economic and
Fiscal Policy Council became a
very critical institution because
it set the parameters for policy
that constrained the bureaucrats
in the line ministries. After last
September’s election, when
Koizumi won so decisively, he
had the mandate to basically do
whatever he wanted and what
he decided to do was not very
much of anything. Takenaka
eventually was replaced, and
the Economic and Fiscal Policy
Council was captured by the
line ministry bureaucrats, espe-
cially Ministry of Finance
bureaucrats. Ota, now the head
of the Council, published a 
terrific book about the Council
this past summer in which she
draws a rather pessimistic con-
clusion, complaining that after
Takenaka left, the Council lost
its dynamism because bureau-
crats increased their control. It
will be interesting to see if she
is able to turn things around,
but I do not believe you will
ever see the Council function
the way it did under Koizumi
and Takenaka. 
The interaction between
structure and personality is very
interesting and the institutional
reforms to strengthen the prime
minister’s policy making power
is a good case study. Personality
means a lot, and of course
structure does too, because
there is no going back to the
old system. Abe has to figure out
how to strengthen the Council
and the role of the prime minis-
ter’s office in general to
institutionalize, in a sense, this
new institutional structure. He
cannot rely on the force of his
personality as Koizumi did. If
he is not successful, these insti-
tutional reforms will turn out to
be far less significant than many
people currently think they are.
But the point is that there is no
other site for decision making
like there was before. So if the
new institutions in the prime
minister’s office do not operate
well, the decision making
process itself will be impaired. 
I think the Koizumi five and a
half years may be remembered
as a very important and a very
entertaining intermission in
Japanese political history. The
curtain has come down on the
Koizumi administration. There
is no way that Prime Minister
Abe is simply going to continue
Koizumi’s politics. But the cur-
tain is going up on a new stage.
It cannot be the pre-Koizumi
stage because too much has
changed, including institutional
features that were changed in
the late 1990s, especially under
Hashimoto. So the curtain is
going up on a new stage and
we have these new characters,
particularly the main character,
Abe, who has not shown much
about how he is going to govern. 
QUESTION
You said that Abe needs todecide what his position
is about the Yasukuni Shrine
over the next six months. But
considering that he became
popular due to his nationalism,
what kind of policy can Abe use
to consolidate his popularity in
the meantime? 
GERALD CURTIS
I think that he needs tofocus on issues that are
close to people’s real concerns,
which have a lot more to do
with the education of their
children, with pensions, and
with medical care. I would
think that if he conveys the
image of a courageous leader,
not afraid to take positions that
might not be entirely popular,
but are aimed at dealing with
these kinds of issues, it would
serve him very well. He has
some policy positions on 
compulsory school education
reform. Some of them are 
non-controversial, as they have
been batted around for years,
such as the periodic re-exami-
nation and relicensing of
teachers to try to weed out 
the ineffective ones. He also
advocates something like what
Mayor Bloomberg is doing in
New York, giving principals of
schools more power against
the union and things like that.
But his major proposal, though
the details here too are very
vague, is to have a voucher
system so that people can take
these vouchers and send their
kids to the primary or middle
school of their choice. I think
this is an absolutely disastrous
approach and will exacerbate
I think the
Koizumi five and 
a half years may be
remembered as a
very important
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inequalities rather than reduce
them. His idea is that if there is
a good school, people can take
their vouchers and try to get
their kid into the good school,
which leaves the not-so-good
school under pressure to reform
itself. It may be so, but even
under the best circumstances,
it is several years before such
reforms can take place. In the
meantime, the students whose
parents do not have the money
or the ambition for their children
to pass an exam and get into
the good school are going to
get stuck in a school that gets
increasingly worse. You will
then see the kind of problems
we see in the United States. 
There are some things
about the American model that
are worth emulating, but I tell
my Japanese friends that there
are at least two things you
should not look to the United
States as a model for health
insurance and compulsory
school education reform. The
United States has far more to
learn from Japan in these two
areas than Japan has to learn
from the United States. Japanese
spend 8 percent of Gross National
Product (GNP) on health care
and there is universal health
insurance. Americans spend 14
percent of GNP on health care
and 45 million people do not
have health insurance. It is
popular in Japanese conserva-
tive circles to say that just about
everything should be left to 
the private sector. But I do not
think these people really believe
it, even when they say it,
because I do not think most
people have any idea of how it
really works elsewhere. That is
why when people talk about
these issues in Japan, I discount
a lot of it because the whole
context is so different. Even
conservative Japanese recoil in
horror at the idea that the 
government should turn over
health care insurance to the pri-
vate sector and not guarantee
universal health care coverage.
In any case, I think that Abe
should focus on domestic
issues, but my expectation is
that he is going to put a lot of
emphasis on foreign policy and
on rhetoric about Japan playing
a larger role in the world. Since
there is not likely to be much
policy substance behind the
rhetoric, what he will accom-
plish is to unnecessarily scare
some people and create a
mood in the country that I do
not think is very constructive,
but I hope I am wrong. 
QUESTION
One of the results of thelast Lower House elec-
tion was that the LDP made
some inroads in the urban
areas, while the opposition DPJ
made headway in the rural
vote. Do you think the election
results mark a permanent shift
in the LDP, or is that simply a
one-off thing that we will see
erode? If it is a shift, what is the
policy impact?  
GERALD CURTIS
It is a one-off thing, as youput it. The LDP has not
shifted its base from rural
Japan to urban Japan. It was 
a phenomenon of Koizumi’s
popularity. What Koizumi
accomplished was not to shift
the LDP base from rural Japan
to urban Japan, but basically 
to weaken the LDP base every-
where. So that what you have
now is a party system in which
no party really has a strong
base anywhere. The DPJ has a
stronger base in urban Japan
than the LDP, although the
LDP elected more people in
urban Japan in the last election.
But many of the 84 Koizumi
children, the first term Diet
members who were elected
last September, have little hope
of being re-elected. So there is
a great deal of fluidity in voting
behavior, and the change in
the Japanese election system to
a predominantly single-member
district system has had a huge
impact on the political culture.
In the past, you could have a
boring prime minister, but if
you were an LDP incumbent
with a strong personal support
base, you would get re-elected.
And under the medium-sized
election district that existed
until 1993, you only needed 
15 or 20 percent of the vote to
get elected because there were
several people elected in the
same district. So you could
secure your 20 percent of the
vote almost regardless of the
popularity of the prime minis-
ter. What has changed is that
many LDP members now can-
not get elected if their leader is
unpopular. They have to have
a popular leader. Why did Abe
become prime minister?
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Because the LDP figured he
was more popular with the
public than anybody else at
that moment. When you talk to
LDP Diet men about the votes
they can rely on, there are
almost no interest groups left
that can be relied upon to
deliver votes. The one that is
most reliable is not an LDP
supporting group, but the
Komeito supporting Soka
Gakkai. The LDP has a 
coalition with the Komeito, 
not because they need the
Komeito’s votes in the Diet,
but because they need the
Soka Gakkai members’ votes 
in their own election. 
I do not think that Koizumi
accomplished the task of shift-
ing the LDP base from rural 
to urban Japan. He may have
done a lot to destroy the LDP
base, period. Then it becomes
a question of which leader is
more popular. That can be very
dangerous because that creates
a tremendous temptation to
take a populist stance to rally
public support. I thought it was
a big mistake to adopt this elec-
tion system in the first place for
that reason. In a country like
the United States, a multiethnic
country, if you had a propor-
tional representation system,
every group would have its
own party and it would be
chaos. A single member district
system forces social coalitions
in the Democratic Party and in
the Republican Party. It creates
stability. That is part of the
whole attractiveness of single
member district systems in 
pluralistic, multiethnic societies
like ours. But when you have 
a country like Japan and you
have a single member district
system where you have to try
to get a majority of the votes to
win, the consequence is quite
obvious. The two major parties
will say exactly the same thing.
So yes, we may finally see a
transfer of power from the LDP
to the DPJ maybe in the not too
distant future, but how much 
of a difference it will mean in
policy terms is not so clear. The
election system is not going to
be changed, and under the cur-
rent one there is the possibility
of a major swing in support
from one party to the other,
especially now that the LDP
machine is weak and the great
majority of voters are not affili-
ated with any party. That is
why the LDP is running scared
about next summer’s election.
That is why there is going to be
enormous pressure on Abe to
throw government money at
groups that the LDP hopes can
bring it votes. The pressure 
is already starting to build. 
So we will know soon enough
whether Abe resists the pres-
sures to spend and thereby to
keep the fiscal deficit from
increasing, or whether he sides
with those who say that more
spending is necessary to win
the Upper House election,
which in turn is necessary if
Abe hopes to stay in power
beyond next year. 
I do not think 
that Koizumi
accomplished 
the task of shifting
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